On Friday, 13 March, the New York Times published an opinion submitted by journalists who recently attended a media tour of Afghanistan. The Op Ed highlighted the importance of the international effort in Afghanistan and described the situation from their point of view with opinion and analysis. The article made both supporting and critical observations about the current operation. The free exchange of ideas is essential in our democratic societies, and we wholeheartedly welcome opinions – both positive and negative ones. We do however take issue with one particular point presented as fact.
The authors state that “NATO’s forces can’t do antidrug missions, but they can provide assistance like air support and medevac units to American military advisers embedded with Afghan Army units involved with poppy eradication.” The author concludes that “NATO plays a key role in individual antidrug operations, but there is no way to integrate its forces into broader counternarcotics efforts.” This is simply not true.
Until the October 2008 North Atlantic Council decision to pursue the nexus between the insurgency and narcotics trade, NATO’s counter narcotics actions were conducted principally in support of Afghan National Security Forces. Since this decision and the issuance of counter narcotics operational plans to the Commander of ISAF, Gen David McKiernan in February 2009, ISAF has been fully engaged against the narcotics trade. A more proactive strategy is being implemented and it is having an impact. As of 17 March, ISAF forces have undertaken four major counter narcotics operations resulting in the identification and dismantling of 11 narcotics processing labs and caches of drugs worth over $500 Million. Within each one of these facilities were found huge stores of weapons, ammunition, communication equipment, improvised explosive devise making materials, anti-personnel and anti-vehicular mines and other military equipment – clearly proof that the drug trade is interlaced with the insurgency.
These operations, conducted mostly in the contested areas of Regional Command South, were conducted by multiple NATO member and partner nations. These were not uniquely American operations. These were dedicated, intelligence driven operations, targeted specifically at those insurgents using the profits from the heroin and other narcotics to fund their efforts aimed at killing the Afghan National Security Forces and allied troops and destabilizing the Afghan Government through wanton destruction and intimidation. To say that ISAF forces can only serve in a supporting role is a misrepresentation of reality.
In fact, we expect the frequency and tempo of such operations to increase as we further seek to stem the flow of drug money funding the insurgents.
